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Rescuing Basic Equality 
Tom Parr and Adam Slavny 
Abstract: In the philosophical literature on the basis of moral equality, one 
conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all Psychological 
Capacity Accounts. This widely held view crystallises around three 
objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the 
threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an 
individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the 
Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to 
acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals 
are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency 
Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have 
unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess 
the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account 
based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence 
of the account against these objections.  
1. Introduction 
People are morally equal. This claim is widely believed but notoriously difficult 
to clarify. It asserts some form of moral or political equality but does not describe 
the specific rights and duties that are equally held, or explain what grounds these 
equal distributions. This vagueness is all the more problematic given that the 
belief that persons are equal is central to our contemporary political and legal 
culture. Politicians appropriate the rhetoric of equality for strategic purposes, 
attesting to its caché with electorates, and the concept underpins some of the 
most important legal developments in the 20th century, such as the emergence of 
an international human rights culture. It is also foundational to much normative 
philosophy, with many theories championing some set of rights or entitlements 
possessed equally by all citizens or all persons.  
Philosophical debate has focused on articulating the property or set of properties 
that grounds the moral equality of persons. One natural suggestion is that human 
beings typically possess distinctive psychological capacities that explain both (i) 
why they are moral equals to each other, and (ii) why they are not morally equal 
to non-human animals, which lack such capacities. Let’s call any such 
explanation of what grounds moral equality a Psychological Capacity Account. Two 
immediate problems arise for this family of views. The first is that human beings 
possess many psychological capacities, and so it is unclear which capacity or 
combination of capacities grounds moral equality. The second is that most 
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capacities are possessed in different quantities by different individuals. How can a 
relation of moral equality be based on natural capacities that are distributed so 
unevenly? In other words, any Psychological Capacity Account must explain why 
equality is based on what John Rawls calls a range property.1 A range property is a 
binary property that one possesses in virtue of having a scalar capacity or set of 
scalar capacities that fall within a specified range. Only those who possess 
capacities within the required range, regardless of variations above or below this 
threshold, are moral equals. Although the underlying subvenient capacities are 
scalar, the range property itself is binary, since individuals possessing the relevant 
scalar capacities either will or will not fall within the specified range.    
As with all philosophical debates, the literature on moral equality is riddled with 
disagreement. But surprisingly, there is one conclusion that has achieved near 
consensus: that Psychological Capacity Accounts are wrong. Indeed, Richard 
Arneson concludes that they are not even ‘remotely credible’.2 This widely held 
view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection,3 
which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant scalar 
capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second 
is the Variations Objection,4 which holds that there is rational pressure to 
acknowledge that variations in the subvenient scalar capacities are relevant. It is 
unclear why variations in individuals’ capacities both above and below the 
threshold do not undermine the relation of moral equality. The third is the No 
Rational Agency Objection,5 according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have 
unpalatable, even offensive, implications for our treatment of humans who do 
not possess the relevant capacities.  
The objections target the entire family of Psychological Capacity Accounts on the 
assumption that they apply regardless of which capacities are thought to ground 
moral equality. We argue that this is a mistake; we cannot properly assess the 
objections without a specific view in mind. We aim to defend an account based 
on the familiar capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. By 
defending this view, we hope to overturn the widespread judgement that 
Psychological Capacity Accounts are a philosophical cul-de-sac.      
2. The Meaning of Basic Equality 
What does it mean to say that people are morally equal? The claim can be parsed 
in a number of ways: all persons are equally valuable from an impartial 
perspective; all persons possess the same set of rights; all persons are due equal 
treatment of some form, and so on.6 One way to cut through this ambiguity and 
focus on a specific set of issues is to consider cases in which the relation of moral 
equality is present. Consider the following set of cases: 
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Medical Resources 1: We have resources to treat only one of two groups 
of patients, A and B. The groups are of equal size, their illnesses are 
equally life-threatening, and the treatments are equally effective. The 
only relevant difference between the two groups is that the patients in 
A are dogs and the patients in B are humans. 
Medical Resources 2: Same as Medical Resources 1, except that groups A 
and B both contain humans. Instead, the only relevant difference 
between the two groups is that the patients in A are 20 years old and 
the patients in B are 70 years old. 
Medical Resources 3: Same as Medical Resources 2, except that groups A 
and B contain humans of the same age. Instead, the only relevant 
difference is that the patients in A only just meet the threshold for 
possession of the relevant psychological capacities and the patients in 
B possess them to a much higher degree.        
If it is impossible to increase the stock of medical resources, these cases require 
decisions about competing interests. In Medical Resources 1, we should treat the 
humans rather than the dogs. One explanation for this judgement is that humans 
possess a set of psychological capacities that distinguish their claims on our 
resources from those of dogs. However, this does not imply that claims on 
resources by those who possess these capacities cannot vary. For example, in 
Medical Resources 2, we think that the age of the patients does affect their 
entitlement to medical assistance. Typically, it is much worse to die at 20 than at 
70, so the younger patients have a stronger claim to assistance. Perhaps others 
will reject this verdict and hold that there should be equal access even if the needs 
of both groups cannot be satisfied. We disagree, but our purpose here is not to 
settle this question but rather to explain how our claim about the scope of moral 
equality is circumscribed. Its proponents need not deny that there can be some 
morally relevant differences between moral equals.  
We can illustrate our claim with Medical Resources 3. In this case, a specific type of 
variation between groups A and B – variation in the degree to which they possess 
the relevant capacities above a threshold – does not affect their claim to the 
resources. This is true even if those who possess the capacities to a greater degree 
benefit more from the same resources than those who possess them at the 
minimum threshold.7 We should therefore either divide resources equally 
between the groups or give each group an equal chance to access them. This is 
the judgement that an account of basic equality must defend. 
These cases involve the interest in continuing to live. We make a similar claim 
about other interests, such as the interest in having opportunities to pursue one’s 
conception of the good. Consider another set of cases: 
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Paralysis 1: Two equally-sized groups of individuals, A and B, are 
unable to move. We have a drug that temporarily removes paralysis, 
but only enough to cure the patients for one day a week. The only 
relevant difference between the two groups is that members of A are 
dogs and members of B are humans. 
Paralysis 2: Same as Paralysis 1, except that groups A and B both 
contain humans. Instead, the only relevant difference between the two 
groups is that the members of A are 20 years old and the members of 
B are 70 years old. 
Paralysis 3: Same as Paralysis 2, except that groups A and B contain 
humans of the same age. Instead, the only relevant difference is that 
the members of A only just meet the threshold for possession of the 
relevant psychological capacities and the members of B possess them 
to a much higher degree.        
We make the same claims in this series of cases: in Paralysis 1, we should cure the 
humans once a week; in Paralysis 2, we should cure the young once a week; and, 
in Paralysis 3, we should not give preference to either group.   
Psychological Capacity Accounts explain these judgments, but also go further. They 
show that the relevant psychological capacities generate a distinctive set of basic 
interests that justify a corresponding set of rights and duties that are possessed 
equally by all individuals who have such interests. We will call the equal 
possession of these rights and duties basic equality, though we acknowledge that 
our use of this phrase may differ from others’. By caching out our view in terms 
of basic interests and a corresponding set of rights and duties, we hope to pre-
empt the assumption that basic equality must be overly expansive in its 
implications. For example, we might take basic equality to mean that all people 
matter equally from a moral point of view or that there is some moral assessment of 
us that is equal. These conceptions of basic equality, aside from being vague, are 
also too broad.8 After all, the claim that people are moral equals should not 
undermine the possibility that some of our rights can be forfeited or that we can 
assess some people as more virtuous than others.9  
What is the content of the rights and duties that basic equality grounds?10 To 
answer this question, it may be helpful to refer to the distinction between 
substantive and formal equality.11 Substantive equality entails a non-instrumental 
commitment to equal claims to goods or resources of the kind that egalitarians 
typically endorse.12 This form of equality is controversial and it is rejected by 
theorists on both sides of the political spectrum, such as some prioritarians and 
sufficientarians (on the left) and some libertarians (on the right).13 We can 
contrast this with formal equality, according to which all members of a particular 
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group equally possess some set of rights. This is a more limited requirement, 
since it is silent about the content of the rights that individuals possess equally. 
Unlike the former, this belief is shared by many views across the political 
spectrum. For example, both Nozickian libertarians and Rawlsian liberal 
egalitarians believe that persons share a set of rights, even though they disagree 
sharply about its content.14  
It is not obvious that Psychological Capacity Accounts provide a general basis for 
either substantive or formal equality. They differ from substantive equality 
because the rights and duties of basic equality may fall short of a full set of 
egalitarian entitlements. We leave open the possibility that basic equality is 
consistent with some degree of socio-economic inequality, for example.15 It also 
differs from formal equality because there are some rights and duties – such as the 
right against suffering certain kinds of pain and the duty not to inflict it – that are 
not plausibly grounded in the same psychological capacities that ground basic 
equality. Whilst the equal possession of such rights and duties would be a version 
of formal equality, it would not fall within the ambit of basic equality, since this 
has substantive commitments, namely to rights and duties whose content is 
shaped by the nature of the capacities in question. To put the point another way, 
basic equality does not entail substantive equality and is not entailed by formal 
equality.      
We refrain from offering a more detailed exposition of the rights that basic 
equality grounds because there are a range of views available, and because it is 
not necessary to commit to any of them to investigate whether Psychological 
Capacity Accounts can avoid the objections outlined above. Moreover, there are 
some rights plausibly connected to basic equality that are sufficiently complex to 
warrant a separate treatment. For example, the right to vote may be justified 
partly with reference to the psychological capacities that ground basic equality, 
but also because of its instrumental value. It is best to leave such cases out of our 
defence of basic equality.  
Despite these caveats, it is worth emphasising how narrowing our project in this 
way does not define away some of the central philosophical criticisms levelled at 
explanations of basic equality. Our defence of basic equality must still overcome 
the Arbitrariness Objection, the Variations Objection, and the No Rational Agency 
Objection.         
3. Basic Interests and Basic Equality 
There are several psychological capacities that plausibly set most human beings 
apart, in degree or kind, from many non-human animals. Here we focus on a 
core capacity that defines humans as autonomous beings: the ability to form, 
revise, and pursue a conception of the good.16 Before we show how an account 
6 
 
that incorporates this capacity into its explanation of basic equality avoids the 
objections, let’s briefly outline what the capacity involves.  
A conception of the good is a set of beliefs and attitudes about what our aims and 
ends ought to be. These conceptions manifest in a multitude of decisions and 
behaviours: our career paths, how we spend our leisure time, the associations to 
which we belong, and so on. They can encompass metaphysical beliefs, since 
such beliefs often have implications about how we ought to live. For example, 
Christians who believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ may take this as a reason to 
follow his teaching. The core beliefs that constitute a person’s conception of the 
good are about values, such as the belief that it is good to live a life of generosity, 
bravery, patriotism, or spirituality. Taken together, and over the course of a 
lifetime, these beliefs form an overall vision of what it is to live well.  
To pre-empt the common criticism that this analysis is unduly individualistic or 
rationalistic, we offer some clarifications. First, an individual may conceive of her 
good as relative to her or as something that would be good for anyone. She may 
believe that a spiritual life is one of many ways to flourish or that others can 
flourish only if they live such a life – both attitudes would qualify as part of her 
conception of the good. Second, her conception of the good can aim at either 
personal or impersonal value, and it may be either self- or other-regarding. She 
may think that she ought to dedicate her life to achieving impersonal value, such 
as the protection of endangered species, or by furthering the interests of others, so 
her beliefs about the good need not strictly relate to her personal good. Finally, 
her conception of the good need not be fully precise, systematic, or consistent.17 
No one lives their life as if they are building a house: in a stage by stage execution 
of a comprehensively pre-conceived plan. Our conceptions of the good are 
constantly evolving, contain many inconsistencies, and are often unfulfilled due 
to weakness of will or external impediments.  
Here is a rough statement of the relevant capacity:    
The Capacity for a Conception of the Good (CCG): An individual has the 
capacity for a conception of the good if and only if she can form, 
revise, and pursue beliefs about the good on the basis of critical 
deliberation. 
According to this definition, an individual must be able to form beliefs about the 
good, which encompass both beliefs about what one’s good is and how one can 
pursue it. However, these beliefs need not track objective reasons. Though we do 
not here commit to an objective account of human flourishing, if such an account 
is correct, it is possible for a person to have a wrongheaded conception of the 
good whilst still possessing the relevant capacity.  
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It is also important that individuals form beliefs about the good at least partly on 
the basis of critical deliberation. Consider two individuals, Ali and Terry. Ali 
carefully considers multiple options in determining her good. She seeks out 
information about a diverse range of mutually exclusive conceptions and 
extensively compares them. She also reflects on the value of these various options 
and the way they might contribute to her good. She makes her choices for the 
reasons she identifies through this critical process. Her resulting conception of the 
good is comprehensive and consistent in the sense that it influences a wide range 
of her beliefs and choices and it does not contain any contradictions. She 
frequently reflects on her choices and occasionally revises them in the light of 
this. Finally, she has a high degree of self-awareness about the deliberative 
process in which she engages. Terry differs from Ali in all these respects. 
Although he meets a minimum standard of critical deliberation, because of his 
limited capacities he rarely considers his options or their value and he has a 
deeply fragmented and inconsistent set of beliefs about his good. He is also so 
impulsive that his beliefs about the good often fail to guide his action. Although 
Ali represents the ideal deliberator, Terry still meets the required threshold. He 
just about possesses a capacity to pursue a conception of the good, albeit a rough, 
impulsive, and inconsistent one. This comparison clarifies the way in which the 
threshold of critical deliberation is relatively undemanding.  
As our comparison between Ali and Terry shows, individuals can vary 
significantly in how well they exercise their CCG. Some can employ this ability 
more consistently, critically, and reflectively than others. This reveals a 
distinction between two kinds of interests. The first is the interest in exercising a 
capacity well. It is plausible that we have an interest in achieving excellence in 
exercising some of our physical and psychological capacities. Indeed, many 
dedicate their lives to such achievements. It is also plausible that the strength of 
this interest is roughly scalar. The better our achievement, the better we satisfy 
our interest in exercising our capacities well. But we can contrast this with a 
second, distinct interest in exercising a capacity tout court. Our interest in the mere 
exercise of a capacity does not vary according to how well we exercise it, as 
exercising a capacity poorly entails exercising it tout court just as must as 
exercising it well. In the context of the CCG, this distinction explains the sense in 
which we have an interest in participating in the central human practice of 
forming, revising, and pursuing a conception of the good, which is independent 
of our interest in exercising this capacity well. The capacity to pursue a 
conception of the good tout court is a range property. There is a threshold below 
which an individual lacks the necessary subvenient properties for the CCG. But 
variations in those subvenient properties above this threshold do not affect the 
ability to exercise the CCG tout court, even though they do affect the ability to 
exercise it well. 
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It is a mistake to conclude that, merely because it is a range property, the interest 
in exercising the CCG tout court can ground basic equality. Rather, it’s being a 
range property is necessary but not sufficient for this purpose. We also need a 
substantive moral argument in support of this claim. However, it’s not difficult to 
see how the interest in exercising the CCG tout court can play this role, given its 
intimate connection to the familiar idea that individuals have a weighty interest 
in being the author of their own lives. Different philosophers take this to entail 
different things. For some, an individual enjoys self-authorship whenever she is 
not wrongfully coerced. For others, self-authorship is much more demanding. 
Perhaps it requires that she have an adequate range of options from which to 
choose, and also that others refrain from shaping her ethical values or the 
character of the options that are available to her. What unites these views is their 
convergence on the idea that every individual has an important interest in 
determining the goals that she pursues.  
We will not develop a specific account of our interest in self-authorship here. 
Rather, we suggest that all of these views require something like the CCG, but 
not necessarily the ability to exercise the CCG to a high standard. Being the 
author of one’s own life, on most plausible conceptions, is an interest in 
exercising a capacity tout court, rather than exercising it well. That is, it is an 
interest in participating in the practice of self-authorship. Self-authorship means 
living a life according to one’s own values, not necessarily the most rationally 
justifiable, consistent, and reflective values. We do not deny that there is an 
additional interest in exercising the CCG well, just as there is an interest in 
achieving excellence in the exercise of many other capacities. For example, 
suppose that Ali pursues her ambitious to become a writer and political activist, 
achieving widespread admiration, whilst Terry dedicates his time to watching 
every available soap opera. We might think that Ali exercises her capacities better 
than Terry. But, as long as Terry meets the relevant threshold, we should not 
deny that he exercises his CCG, and therefore lives a self-authored life.  
4. The Arbitrariness Objection 
Let’s revisit the first objection to Psychological Capacity Accounts. This is the worry 
that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant scalar properties places 
an individual within the range that grants her basic equality is arbitrary. Since the 
subvenient properties that comprise the CCG are scalar, there is no obvious point 
to place the threshold. If individuals can possess rational agency in greater or 
lesser quantities, why is the threshold placed just where defenders of the account 
say it is? Without a convincing answer, we might suspect that the threshold is so 
placed simply to meet pre-established conclusions, such as the almost universal 
belief that most human beings fall above the threshold whilst non-human animals 
fall below it. Not only is such an argument circular, since it assumes a particular 
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placement for the threshold in order to ‘show’ that human beings lie above it, it 
also smacks of speciesism.  
The Arbitrariness Objection is the weakest of the three objections. The immediate 
answer to it is that the possession of the CCG determines where the threshold 
lies. The Arbitrariness Objection is too quick to assume that the range property must 
be arbitrary simply because it attaches to a set of properties that, taken 
individually, are scalar. The source of the confusion, we suggest, is a failure to 
appreciate the difference between the complex capacities represented by the CCG 
and the subvenient properties that constitute them. Though the underlying 
properties are scalar, possession of the CCG is not. The question about whether 
an individual possesses the CCG must, in most cases, be met with one of two 
answers. On the account that we defend, therefore, we have principled reasons 
for placing the threshold at a particular level as that is the level at which 
possession of the CCG emerges from the subvenient capacities.  
This is not to deny that the threshold is subject to vagueness. Specifically, there 
may be two forms of vagueness. First, the threshold may be indeterminate: there 
may be no precise increment at which possession of some scalar property 
establishes the CCG. Additionally, there may be multiple sets of underlying 
capacities that are sufficient to establish the CCG. Second, the threshold may be 
subject to epistemic vagueness, such that it is difficult or impossible to ascertain 
whether borderline cases fall above or below the threshold. 
Do these admissions of vagueness threaten the previous judgment that possession 
of the CCG is binary? We think not. This is because binariness is not itself a 
binary property. Instead, binariness exists on a spectrum, with fully scalar 
properties at one end and fully binary properties at the other. The kind of 
binariness that our argument requires is not absolute. It can tolerate a sizable 
number of cases that cannot be said either to possess or not possess the property. 
Such cases are indeterminate, but they do not threaten the discreteness of the two 
categories in question. This is distinct from the idea that there are continuous 
gradations between the two categories. Our view permits indeterminate cases, but 
not cases that can be placed on specific gradations between possessing and not 
possessing the CCG. 
Strictly speaking, only a threshold based on the possession of fully scalar 
properties would be arbitrary. But as long as there are some cases falling above 
and below the threshold, we can identify some criteria for determining where to 
place the threshold. If this were true of the possession of the CCG, the view 
would be unsatisfactory for other reasons, as it would be overwhelmed with 
indeterminacy. But this is not the case. When compared with the full range of the 
scalar properties that constitute the CCG, the area of indeterminacy is relatively 
small.            
10 
 
To return to the Arbitrariness Objection, conceding that the threshold is vague in 
one or more of these senses is not to concede that it is arbitrary. We retain criteria 
by which to judge where the threshold lies, even if their application is sometimes 
indeterminate and/or difficult. Of course, vagueness has its own problems, 
particularly when we face borderline cases. But this is a much less significant 
problem than arbitrariness. Whereas arbitrariness is a fatal shortcoming, since it 
suggests a lack of justification, vagueness is problematic for only borderline cases.   
5. The Variations Objection 
The second objection is that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that the 
scalar properties on which the range property depends are also relevant. It will be 
helpful to distinguish two versions of this objection. One focuses on variations 
above the threshold and the other on variations below it. It is unclear why 
variations in individuals’ CCG both above and below the threshold do not 
undermine the relation of basic equality. Although we have clarified that the 
possession of the CCG is a binary property (albeit one that is subject to vagueness), 
our ability to exercise this capacity well is scalar and varies significantly. Recall 
the contrast between Ali, who is able to exercise her CCG exceptionally, and 
Terry, who barely possesses it at all. Though they equally share the property of 
possessing the capacity, they are not equal in terms of how effectively they can 
exercise it. Similarly, compare Ali* with Terry*. Ali* falls just short of the 
threshold, whilst Terry* is well below it. Why shouldn’t these differences below 
the threshold affect their moral entitlements? The Variations Objection challenges 
us to explain why these differences do not threaten basic equality.   
To help evaluate this objection, consider the following example: 
Prison Chess: A prison has the resources to allow its inmates to 
participate in only one creative and intellectual activity: chess. Some 
inmates are just about competent to play the game whilst others are 
excellent. The prison manager has the task of allocating limited 
playing time amongst inmates. 
Before we discuss how this case helps us respond to the Variations Objection, it will 
be useful to clarify the importance of this example for basic equality. Here are 
three respects in which Prison Chess helps to illuminate basic interests. First, the 
interests in both cases are non-exhaustive, in the sense that they exist alongside 
other interests. Just as inmates have interests aside from playing chess, so too 
individuals have interests aside from those generated by the CCG. Moreover, 
engaging with the game may satisfy multiple interests, including the interest in 
having a pleasurable experience. We focus on the specific interest in participating 
in the creative and intellectual experience of playing chess. Second, although they 
are non-exhaustive, the interests in both cases are part of a set of the most 
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significant interests that an individual has. Notwithstanding the differences 
between various theories of human flourishing, both creative and intellectual 
expression and autonomous living feature heavily in most. Third, the interests are 
distinctive and are connected with a set of opportunities that are uniquely capable 
of realising them. In other words, these interests are ones that cannot be realised 
through any alternative means (in Prison Chess, this is because we stipulate that 
the inmates lack access to any other form of creative or intellectual stimulation). 
Taken together, these three features are capable of justifying certain rights and, in 
particular, the rights that we can justify by appeal to a concern for basic 
equality.18 
Let’s return to Prison Chess. Should the prison manager allocate playing time 
according to chess ability or apportion it equally? All else being equal, it is 
intuitive that the manager should allocate playing time equally, irrespective of 
variations in talent above the threshold. A barely competent player is entitled to 
the same amount of time as an excellent player. This means that resources should 
be allocated to inmates on the basis of a range property: those who fall within the 
range are entitled to certain goods and variations within the range do not affect 
the size of the entitlement. We can contrast this with how we ought to allocate 
resources in a professional chess team. Since the overarching aim in the 
professional team is to foster excellence, it is appropriate to allocate resources in a 
way that is sensitive to variations in ability. But given the unique creative and 
intellectual role that chess plays in the inmates’ lives, and given the limitation on 
the prison’s resources, it would be objectionable for the manager to aim at 
fostering excellence. In other words, she ought to give considerable priority to the 
interest in exercising creative and intellectual capacities over the interest in 
attaining excellence.   
One might object that the prison authorities have professional duties to prisoners, 
and it is these duties that explain how the officers should distribute resources in 
this case. We doubt that our judgement about Prison Chess is dependent on this 
contextual factor. We discuss the distribution of resources in prison because it is 
an intuitive example, but that same analysis applies in other cases of this kind. 
For example, a group stranded on a desert island with only a chess board should 
distribute resources similarly. Additionally, referring to professional duties is not 
dispositive because the equal distribution of resources required by those duties 
may depend on the interest-based argument we provide. After all, the 
professional duty may require treating the prisoners fairly and equally, where this 
is true partly for reasons relating to their basic equality.        
The same kind of reasoning shows how we can respond to the Variations 
Objection. We have explained why the interest in exercising the CCG tout court is 
both weighty and distinct. In these respects, it is analogous to the inmates’ 
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interest in playing chess. Accordingly, we ought similarly to give considerable 
priority to this basic interest over the interest of a few individuals in exercising 
their CCG to a much higher degree. The Variations Objection fails because it 
confuses the interest on which basic equality depends. Entitlements grounded in 
basic equality do not depend directly on interests that track scalar psychological 
properties. They depend on the distinct interest in exercising the CCG tout court, 
in participating in living a self-authored life rather than doing so to a high 
standard. Moreover, since this interest plausibly has considerable priority over 
the interest that does track scalar properties (the interest in exercising the capacity 
well), we have an explanation of why variations above the threshold do not affect 
the entitlements.       
We can now see why, in Medical Resources 3 and Paralysis 3, variations in the 
degree to which A and B possess the CCG do not affect their entitlements either 
to medical resources or to freedom of movement. In Paralysis 3, the interest in 
pursuing one’s conception of the good for a limited time has priority in the 
allocation of resources. Similarly, in Medical Resources 3, since access to life-
preserving treatment is a precondition for the exercise of the CCG, equally 
protecting opportunities to exercise it tout court takes priority over giving greater 
protection to those who can exercise it well. For example, let’s suppose that one 
patient has sufficient resources to exercise their CCG tout court but that they 
require a further unit to enable them to exercise it better. Let’s also suppose that 
another patient requires a further unit to exercise their CCG tout court. In conflicts 
of this kind, when resources are scarce, the interest in exercising the CCG tout 
court has priority over the interest in exercising it well.  
We conceded earlier that exercising the CCG well is a morally relevant interest. 
One might then object that the combined interests justify unequal distribution of 
rights. Why can’t we say that those who are just about competent and those who 
are excellent in the exercise of their CCG have an equal interest in exercising the 
capacity tout court, but since only the latter also have an interest in attaining 
excellence, they have a claim to favourable treatment based on the combined 
weight of these interests? In circumstances of overabundance, when each 
individual has fully satisfied their interest in exercising their CCG tout court, 
perhaps some individuals would have a claim to extra resources for this reason. 
We claim only that the interest in exercising the CCG tout court has priority in the 
event of a conflict. Furthermore, most cases in which basic equality is pertinent 
do not involve an overabundance of resources: in the world in which we live, we 
cannot full satisfy everyone’s interest in exercising their CCG tout court. 
Consequently, appealing to one person’s interest in exercising the CCG well 
cannot justify the use of a resource that could otherwise be used to satisfy another 
person’s interest in exercising it tout court. For example, in Prison Chess, the 
allocation of more time to skilled players deprives others of the ability to 
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participate, or at least reduces time in which they can satisfy their interest in 
merely participating.     
A different objection is that our reasoning justifies only the weighted priority of the 
interest in exercising the CCG tout court, rather than absolute priority. Perhaps 
there are beings capable of such sublime autonomy that their achievement can 
justifiably deprive others of the chance to take part. This would be analogous to a 
version of Prison Chess in which one inmate enjoys almost super-human abilities 
but needs a greater-than-equal share of playing time in order to realise her talent. 
We stress that there is no need for us to exclude this theoretical possibility. Our 
claim is the more practically pertinent one that no human deliberators in fact 
meet this condition.  
For distinct reasons, variations below the threshold also do not threaten our 
defence of basic equality. In Prison Chess, a person who just about lacks the 
capacity to play chess is similar to a person who is nowhere near it in the sense 
that both lack the capacity to participate in an activity in which they would 
otherwise have a weighty interest. But this similarity can mask other important 
differences, and we should point out one respect in which Prison Chess is 
disanalogous to Paralysis and Medical Resources. 
If the prison manager were to allocate a chessboard to a person who is unable to 
play chess (assuming she does not use it for any other valuable purpose), it is a 
wasted resource. By contrast, in Paralysis and Medical Resources, freedom and 
health are valuable even to those who lack a CCG. For example, non-human 
animals would benefit from these things even if the interests thereby satisfied are 
different to the human interest that would be satisfied by the same resources. 
Therefore, we accept that variations below the threshold might matter in this 
way, whilst variations above it do not. In this respect, the view we defend is 
asymmetrical. This asymmetry arises from the fact that there may be important 
interests that depend on the same underlying capacities as the CCG below the 
threshold but not above it.  
The more modest point is simply that, as we emphasised in section 3, the 
activities that are made possible by an individual’s possession of the CCG tout 
court have central and distinctive value, even if there are other valuable activities 
that do not depend upon an individual’s possession of it. It is important to 
emphasise that this point does not concede too much. As we noted before, the 
threshold may be subject to significant vagueness. Individuals who possess the 
subvenient capacities to a large degree but fall short of the CCG will be very 
difficult to identify. Our intuitions about the entitlements of such individuals will 
be heavily affected by this vagueness. Moreover, we may have good reasons to 
err on the side of caution and treat individuals as if they possess the CCG unless 
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we are reasonably certain that they do not. All of this is important for how we 
address borderline cases – a complex issue in itself – but it also underscores the 
point that there is at least a substantial difference between those who possess the 
CCG and those who clearly do not. Whilst those who clearly fall below the 
threshold, such as dogs, have some interest in access to resources based on 
exercising the same subvenient capacities that generate the CCG at higher levels, 
this interest does not approach the interest in exercising the CCG. 
Similarly, some have pressed the Variations Objection to basic equality on the 
grounds that variations in psychological capacities below the threshold seem to 
make a moral difference.19 Many people believe that it would be wrong to 
perform the kind of experimentation on a chimpanzee that it might be 
permissible to perform on a mouse. We can explicate this difference in terms of 
the more developed psychological capacities of the chimpanzee. Why, then, 
should variations above the threshold not make a moral difference when 
variations below the threshold do? The answer is that there are complex 
capacities and corresponding interests (besides the CCG) that occur below the 
threshold of basic equality. One of these is the ability to experience emotional 
distress, which is possessed by some living things and not others. Those with this 
capacity are due moral treatment that those without it are not. This is one 
capacity that may distinguish the mouse from the chimpanzee and thus explain 
why certain kinds of experimentation, which tend to cause emotional distress in 
some animals, cannot permissibly be performed on chimpanzees. We leave open 
the possibility that there are other morally relevant complex capacities, with 
corresponding interests, that occur above the threshold. We are unsure what these 
may be, but if they exist they do not negate the point that the rights and duties 
grounded in the possession of the CCG should be equally distributed.           
6. The No Rational Agency Objection 
The third objection to Psychological Capacity Accounts is that they have unpalatable, 
perhaps offensive, implications for our treatment of those humans who do not 
possess the CCG, such as children or adults with severe cognitive disabilities. 
This is the No Rational Agency Objection. We must be careful here to clarify the 
implications of our view. It bears noting that that the threshold for possession of 
the relevant interest is reasonably low. As we explained in section 3, since the 
interest to which we appeal is in pursuing a conception of one’s good tout court, 
rather than doing it well or without assistance, a person need not be in possession 
of typical levels of intelligence or agency to enjoy this interest. One virtue of our 
view is that it explains how children and those with a wide range of cognitive 
impairments often have the same interest as others in exercising their CCG. 
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Nevertheless, those who do not possess the CCG are not entitled to basic 
equality, and this implication may be rejected by some. To illustrate, consider the 
following case:       
Medical Resources 4: We have resources to treat only one of two groups 
of patients, A and B. The groups are of equal size, their illnesses are 
equally life-threatening, and the treatments are equally effective. The 
only relevant difference between the two groups is that the patients in 
A have such severe cognitive disabilities that they are completely 
unable to reason or make choices about their good for themselves.  
It is not clear which, if any, humans meet this description. But assuming there are 
humans who completely lack the CCG (group A), does our view imply that 
group B, and not group A, are entitled to the treatment? Although our view 
appears to have this implication, this would be too hasty. Our view implies only 
that a concern for possession of the CCG will not yield the conclusion that the 
two groups have equal claims to the treatment. On reflection, this is obvious. It 
follows from the fact that members of group A lack the CCG. It is true that, on 
our view, the possession of the CCG grounds the equal possession of a set of 
rights, and individuals who lack it do not possess these rights. But this is not an 
offensive implication: individuals do not have rights when those rights are 
grounded in interests that they lack. It is acceptable that a young infant lacks 
some of the rights, such as the right to vote, enjoyed by adults who possess the 
relevant capacities that give her an interest in voting. 
Moreover, young infants may enjoy a number of rights based on the interests that 
they do have. Similarly, adult humans who lack the CCG may also possess an 
array of rights grounded in their other interests. Consequently, those who do not 
possess the CCG may enjoy the same rights but on different grounds. At this point, 
it might be objected that the same can be said about our initial judgments in 
Medical Resources 1 and Paralysis 1? Unequal possession of the CCG does not yield 
the conclusion that dogs and human beings should be treated unequally. It is 
consistent with our view that dogs and humans should be treated equally on the 
basis of some other consideration. 
Whilst this is true, whether equal treatment is justified in any given scenario 
depends on whether there is a plausible substantive argument showing that there 
are independent considerations that justify this treatment. We doubt there are any 
considerations in Medical Resources 1 and Paralysis 1 that justify equal treatment of 
dogs and humans, but it is more plausible that such alternative considerations 
exist in Medical Resources 4. For example, it could be argued that membership of 
the human species yields separate reasons to treat human beings equally, even if 
they do not all possess the CCG. On this view, respect for the value of human life 
is not grounded solely in the capacities of individuals, but the typical life-cycle to 
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which the individual belongs.20 An alternative view is offered by Eva Kittay, who 
rejects the focus on psychological capacities altogether, and instead emphasises 
the value of the relationships we establish with other members of the human 
community, regardless of their psychological capacities. The significance of these 
relationships is incomparable to any relationship a human can have with a non-
human animal (indeed, the very comparison may be offensive) and those who 
participate in these relationships are entitled to the support and resources 
required to fulfil the obligations that they generate.21  
These views face serious challenges. Why should the typical life-cycle of a species 
have any relevance to our treatment of a particular individual who does not have 
such a life-cycle? Similarly, although it is plausible that our relationships with 
members of the human community are significant, the appeal to the relationship 
rather than the intrinsic worth of any individuals is problematic, as what does it 
imply about our treatment of severely cognitively impaired human beings who do 
not have such relationships? We do not have the space here to embark on 
detailed critical analysis of these and other views. Instead, we note only that our 
view is consistent with these attempts.22 Defending basic interests arising from the 
CCG does not preclude the possibility that other factors are also relevant and 
explain our intuitions about some contested cases.   
To summarise, we believe there are two possible responses to Medical Resources 4. 
One is the controversial judgment that we should give priority to group B on the 
grounds that only they possess the CCG. A second possibility is that there is 
some other consideration that explains why both groups have equal claims in this 
case. Unless it can be shown that the rights grounded in the CCG somehow 
undermine the claim that membership of the human species or relationships with 
such members are morally significant, we must be open to the possibility that 
there are multiple grounds that justify distinct but overlapping sets of rights.  
In the light of our claim that our account is consistent with some other attempts 
to demonstrate basic equality, one might worry that our argument is redundant 
since, if there is some other argument that can justify equal claims to treatment 
between those who possess the CCG and those who lack it, then it’s now unclear 
what turns on its possession. This claim is also too strong. We should emphasise 
that, whilst the possession of the CCG is not necessary to ground an equal set of 
rights, it remains sufficient to do so.23 The plausibility of the view must also be 
considered in the context of its ability to respond to the Arbitrariness Objection and 
the Variations Objection, where we argue that our view has an edge on its 
competitors.     
There is a further worry that, even if those who do not possess the CCG may 
have interests that overlap with those who do, this does not entail equal 
treatment. It may be argued that the possession of the CCG confers general value 
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or moral status upon its holders. Accordingly, when two beings with different 
properties have the same interest, we can decide which should have priority by 
determining which being has greater value or moral status. For example, a dog 
and a person may have the same basic interest in continuing to live, but since the 
latter is grounded in a more valuable capacity than the former, then we have a 
substantive reason to give priority to the person over the dog. This seems to 
provide us with a justification for the judgment in Medical Resources 1. On the 
other hand, if this is true, we cannot conclude that two beings with different 
properties have equal claims. Hence, it becomes more difficult to see why groups 
A and B should have equal claims to medical treatment in Medical Resources 4 in 
so far as we assume that members of the two groups have the same interest 
grounded in different capacities. The possession of the CCG may make a being’s 
interest more significant than the same interest possessed by a being that lacks the 
CCG.   
Admittedly, it is intuitive that a person’s interest in continuing to live has priority 
over that of a dog. But it is too hasty to conclude that this is because the CCG 
confers general value or status. We can draw this conclusion only if the interests 
in question are substantively similar, for only then can we safely attribute the 
stronger claim of one party to a general value or status-conferring property rather 
than a substantively different interest. For example, the interest in continuing to 
live, although it is possessed by both humans and dogs, is substantively different 
for each group, since death frustrates a person’s autonomously chosen plans and 
projects, but not those of dogs. Even the interest in avoiding physical pain may be 
different if it is accompanied by forms of anxiety and emotional distress in 
humans but not dogs. Ultimately, as a result of interaction effects between 
different properties, it is very difficult to construct a case in which the two 
interests are substantively similar. However, without such cases, it is difficult to 
motivate the view that the CCG confers general value or status.             
A final observation about the No Rational Agency Objection is worth making. The 
objection encourage us to think more carefully about which ground we should we 
honour with the title of basic equality. Part of the problem here is the language in 
which these debates are traditionally couched. Basic equality in popular rhetoric 
has great import and any denial of it is perceived by some to legitimate serious 
wrongdoing and inhumane treatment to the excluded group. One thing 
philosophy can do to address this is to demystify basic equality. When basic 
equality is understood as the equal distribution of rights based on a particular 
interest, it becomes clear that there are many relations of equality, distinct from 
what we have called basic equality, each obtaining between different but 




One strategy would be to abandon the term ‘basic equality’, since it seems to 
imply that beings outside the favoured group are due less moral concern than 
those within it. This implication is fallacious for the reasons we gave, but the 
fallacy might justify altering the language used in order to avoid 
misunderstanding. In fact, the language of basic equality arguably courts this 
interpretation and is therefore exclusive and offensive, even if the substantive 
position is not. Perhaps, for these reasons, we are wrong to appropriate this 
language without alteration. However, there are reasons to retain the terminology 
as well. As we have argued, Psychological Capacity Accounts can explain a range of 
judgments and convictions that are commonly associated with a foundational 
form of equality. It may be better, then, to keep the term but explain how its 
alleged offensive implications are false. This is the strategy we adopt in the 
present paper, and we hope we have explained why basic equality, as we 
understand it, is only one moral consideration among others, albeit a significant 
one.24  
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